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Abstract
The prize system for innovation has been criticized as impractical due to the lack of a workable
formula or algorithm to determine the size of prizes. In this paper, a decentralized market mechanism
via the intertemporal bounty (IB) system can function to duplicate Pareto optimality. Under this system,
any bountiable innovation is placed in the public domain, and the prize of innovation is dynamically
amortized in an infinitely time domain as periodic bounties paid to holders of bounty claims. Peri-
odic bounties are calculated using a government-determined bounty rate times observed market sales.
Two formulas are derived to calculate “long-run Pareto optimal bounty rate” and “long-run suboptimal
bounty rate.” The former can correct monopoly distortions and externalities, while the latter can only
address monopoly distortions. They are empirically computable and can serve as an upper bound and the
lower bound of the bounty rate. This paper provides a dynamic general-equilibrium analysis of replacing
finitely-lived patents with the IB system using either of these two bounty rates. Based on a non-scale
growth model calibrated to the US economy, transition paths are worked out to compute welfare gains.
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1 Introduction
There are alternative reward systems including patent and prize designed to promote technological innova-
tion.1 Patent is a commercial reward system for the government to confer upon the innovator short-lived in-
tellectual property rights. This allows the innovator to turn the shadow price of a patent-protected innovation
into a reward in the form of monopoly profits accruing during the granted patent life. Prize is a tax-financed
public reward system for the government to award a prize for the innovator to place an innovation in the
public domain. The prize is awarded, once and for all, to reflect its social value. Hence, a prize system can
spur innovation without creating monopoly distortions.2 The patent system, however, must always seek to
balance short-run monopoly distortion against long-run dynamic innovation [Nordhaus (1969)], and tends
to provide inadequate incentives for innovation in that the shadow price of a patent-protected innovation
is usually below the social value.3 If the government knows how to set prizes to the social value, a prize
system can be Pareto optimal and outshine the patent system as suboptimal.4
Polanvyi (1944) trumpeted the prize system informally. Four decades later, Wright (1983) developed
a formal model to compare patents and prizes. This seminal paper emphasizes asymmetric information
between governments and innovators, showing that prizes can be superior to patents if the government is
appropriately informed about an innovation’s social surplus and costs. Shavell and Van Ypersele (2001)
restricts asymmetric information to market demand, presuming that the innovator knows the exact market
demand curve and that the government is only informed of its probability distribution. They demonstrate
that an optional patent-or-prize system can dominate the patent system. Under this optional system, the
prize is determined at the smallest possible social surplus, and the innovator is free to choose either a patent
1This paper focuses on patent and prize as two competing reward systems. To avoid terminological confusions, we note that
some economists such as Shavell and Van Ypersele (2001) distinguish intellectual property rights (patents, copyrights, etc.) from
all reward systems.
2Some tax-induced distortions may take place if lump-sum taxes are unavailable. However, technical innovations have public-
good features. Prizes for innovation can be financed in a manner that results in no additional distortion; see Kaplow (1996) and
Footnote 6 of Kremer (1998).
3Whether patents had contributed to innovation and productivity has recently been questioned in Boldrin and Levine (2013)
and Williams (2013). In theory, patents may lead to over-investment in research and development, if externatlities such as research
congestion or patent races are significant enough to diminish an innovation’s social value. This possibility appears in the present
paper , Jones and Williams (2000) and others. Empirically, under-investment in R&D is however so obvious: the social rate return
to R&D is at least twice the private rate of return according to Mansfiled et al. (1977, 1981) and Jones and Williams (2000).
4Many studies have sought to improve efficiency by fine-tuning a patent’s dimensions such as length, or scope, or both; see,
for instance, Judd (1985), Gilbert and Shapino (1990), Klemperer (1990), Matutes et al. (1996), and O’Donoghue and Zweimüller
(2004). But patents, designed to function by introducing monopolies, are doomed to be suboptimal, no matter how one fine-tunes
their dimensions. Besides, it is difficult to harmonize patents and other form of intellectual property rights between developed and
developing economies; see Helpman (1993) and Grinols and Lin (2006).
or a prize.5
In principle, prize systems — either optional or mandatory — are subject to the government’s informa-
tional readiness to determine the social value of innovations. This concern has been raised in Wright (1983),
Scotchmer (1999), Shavell and Van Ypersele (2001) and Hopenhayn et al. (2006). To resolve this prob-
lem, Kremer (1998) suggests a patent buyouts mechanism to determine the private value or shadow price of
patents through an auction process.6 The government then offers to purchase patents at this private value
times some constant markup to match up to the social value, and these purchased patents would be mostly
placed in the public domain.7 Kremer’s idea is clever because auctioning patents allows the government to
harness private information.
However, there are some limitations on previous patent-prize studies. First, they use static partial-
equilibrium models to highlight the role of asymmetric information. This approach does not allow the
dynamic general-equilibriummarket mechanism to work, for instance, to effect an innovation’s private value
and social value as well as the required rate of return that makes households willing to finance business firm’s
forward-looking investments. Moreover, static models cannot unfold the dynamic nature of innovating
activities that invent new products or processes over time. Second, these previous studies always posit a
prize system that pays prizes, once and for all, for technological innovation. True, in static models, prizes
cannot be awarded with any intertemporal arrangement. But in a dynamic real world, the social value of
any innovation at a point in time is a discounted sum of the value stream it emanates in the future. This
applies to the private value as well. An observed innovation is valuable today, but its value, either social or
private, will change over time, and may even risk being destroyed by competing products or processes in the
future. Accordingly, prizes are forward-looking and difficult to estimate especially for new innovations. The
government may award a prize for some innovation that is worth nothing in the future. Third, as Abramowicz
(2003) argues, there does not exist any workable formula or algorithm to calculate prizes in the literature.8
This makes the prize system impractical.
The purpose of the present paper is to resolve all these limitations existing in the patent-prize literature.
5See Proposition 5 in Shavell and Van Ypersele (2001).
6Guell and Fischbaum (1995) also suggest a different buyouts program for the government to exercise its power of eminent
domain to purchase pharmaceutical patents at a price determined by judges.
7Based on Mansfield (1981), Kremer makes the conservative assumption that the social value of patents is on average twice the
private value. He cautions that the government should prevent bidders from colluding in the auction process.
8This was the reason that Kremer (1998) proposed an auction mechanism for patent buyouts. As Kremer anticipated, some
problems may arise from substitute patents or collusion among bidders. Regardless, it remains difficult for auctioning to determine
the private value of an observed innovation at a point in time, given that this value is subject to future innovations.
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It represents the first work that provides a dynamic general-equilibrium analysis of replacing finitely-lived
patents with a dynamically-amortized prize system, using a non-scale variety-expansion growth model based
on Jones Jones (1995), Jones and Williams (2000) and Eicher and Turnovsky (2001).9 This growth model
features, among other things, a constant population growth rate and a semi-endogenous innovation rate
at which private investment in R&D (research and development) leads to an ongoing flow of innovative
blueprints for manufacturing new types of capital goods. For the modeled economy, patents can create
monopoly price distortions to weaken demand for capital goods, as commonly seen in the literature. More-
over, these distortions can skew the relative prices of patented and unpatented capital goods. This gives rise
to a socially inefficient mix of capital goods in production of final goods and translates into an economy-
wide loss in total factor productivity (TFP).10 The proposed dynamically-amortized prize system can remove
these distortions. Under this system, the reward for a technical innovation (blueprint) is a bounty claim to an
infinite stream of ongoing bounties, payable on ex post (observed) market sales at a government-determined
bounty rate. These sales cover all those capital goods that embody the same blueprint, irrespective of who
these sellers are. That is, instead of a “once-and-for-all” prize as in the literature, the prize is dynami-
cally amortized in an infinite time domain as periodic bounty payments, which are equal to the bounty rate
times observed market sales in each time period. For brevity, I use the intertemporal bounty to refer to a
dynamically-amortized prize system.11
The intertemporal bounty (IB) system as analyzed herein is mandatory. Its designed mechanism is
summarized as follows. First, any innovative blueprint must be placed in the public domain in exchange
for a tradeable bounty claim, thereby creating free access to non-rival innovations (blueprints) and ensuring
competitive provision of any bountiable goods. Second, bounty payments are financed by lump-sum taxes
to sustain an active asset market for bounty claims. The equilibrium price of bounty claims reflects the
discounted present value of expected ongoing bounty flows. That is, a bounty claim’s equilibrium price is
a bountiable innovation’s private value or shadow price. Third, by raising the bounty rate, the government
can increase a bountiable innovation’s private value through an increase in the bounty-claim price, ceteris
9Romer (1990) is a seminal paper introducing an endogenous growth model of expanding variety. Jones (1995) extends Romer
(1990) by removing the well-know scale effects.
10In the endogenous growth literature, little attention was paid to the negative effects of patents on TFP.
11Grinols and Henderson (2007) proposed to replace pharmaceutical patents with an intertemporal-bounty. They discussed the
intertemporal bounty concept in a heuristic way without using a formal model. Later, Grinols and Lin (2011) formulated the
intertemporal-bounty system in a dynamic pharmaceutical sectoral-equilibrium model, where the interest rate and the size of the
pharmaceutical sector are exogenous, among other things. In stark contrast, the present paper incorporates the intertemporal-
bounty system in a non-scale R&D-based growth model of expanding variety, and further relates this system for the first time to a
dynamically amortized prize system with tradeable bounty claims, as will be explained later.
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paribus. This can promote more investment in R&D and spur technological innovation. Fourth, a valuable
flexibility is that the the government can adjust the bounty rate to internalize various externalities such
as knowledge spillovers or research congestion, so that the private value of a potential innovation can be
navigated to the social value. In addition, the government can always fine-tune the bounty rate as desired if
observed economic conditions deviate from policy objectives. In short, an intertemporal bounty system can
function with an adjustable bounty rate and can be Pareto optimal. In contrast, the “once-and-for-all” prize
system is lack of such flexibilities, while patents are suboptimal and inflexible to cope with externalities.
An important contribution of the paper is that I derive a formula to calculate a long-run Pareto optimal
bounty rate for the intertemporal bounty system to be Pareto efficient in the long run. This optimal bounty
rate enables a patent-regime economy to switch to a bounty-regime economy, and then transition over time
to the social planner’s long-run optimum.12 This formula requires information on an economy’s steady-
state aggregate variables (TFP growth rate, final output growth rate, capital share, and real interest rate),
parametrized externalities (knowledge spillovers and research congestion), and price elasticity of bountiable
goods. Data of this sort is empirically available. In addition, I derive a formula to calculate a long-run
suboptimal bounty rate. This bounty rate ensures that in the long run a bounty-regime economy can have the
same R&D intensity as does the current (patent-regime) economy. Paying bounties based on either bounty
rate can remove patent-created monopoly distortions immediately. But to fully internalize externalities in
the long-run, bounties must be based on the long-run Pareto optimal bounty rate. From the perspective of
IB implementation, the two formulas can present two benchmark bounty rates.
For the first time in the patent-prize literature, the dynamic trajectory of an aggregate economy that
switches from patents to a dynamically amortized prize system is solved numerically in the paper. I sim-
ulate the regime switch for a calibrated U.S. economy presumably beginning with a patent-regime steady
state. This switch places all innovations in the public domain, forcing the economy to jump to a new tra-
jectory that guides it to transition over time to a bounty-regime balanced growth path. The dynamics in
transition is governed by a nonlinear system of four first-order ordinary differential equations (ODE) in two
state variables ( capital & knowledge stocks) and two control-like variables (final-output consumption &
bounty-claim price) , where the stock of knowledge is measured by variety of capital goods. This presents
a nonlinear boundary value problem (BVP) and is solved numerically with a Python package that wraps a
12In fact, as the economy transitions to its long-rum social optimum, the Pareto optimal bounty rate should vary over time in
transition. As an initial inquiry into the IB system for a growing economy, this paper dose not apply the time-varying optimization
exercise, but directly sets a time-invariant bounty rate at its long-run optimal level.
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Fortran BVP solver.13
Under a set of plausible benchmark parameters, the long-run Pareto optimal bounty rate is 0.49 (49
cents per dollar sales) and the long-run suboptimal bounty rate is 0.15 (15 cents per dollar sales). If the
regime switch proceeds with with this long-run Pareto optimal bounty rate, the U.S. economy’s steady-state
R&D intensity (measured by the R&D/GDP ratio) will from 0.0297 (patent regime) to 0.10 (bounty regime).
From the computed transition paths, the U.S. economy is seen to transition to one much more intensive in
both capital and knowledge than under the initial patent regime (20 years patent length). For instance, on
the computed bounty-regime balanced growth path, the stock of knowledge is seventeen times as much as
on the initial patent-regime balanced growth path, the stock of capital is three times as much, and per capita
consumption is two times as much.
The central market mechanism works as follow. On the one hand, compared to monopolistic provision,
competitive provision of capital goods expands market demand for forgone consumption and speeds up cap-
ital accumulation. On the other hand, the long-run Pareto bounty rate of 0.49 is strong enough to make the
bounty-claim price jump up to match the social value of a potential innovation, thereby expanding R&D
demand again for foregone consumption and spurring technological innovation. As a result, expanded de-
mand for foregone consumption pushes up the real interest rate in transition to make households willing to
save more to finance capital and knowledge accumulation. Households therefore experience short-run con-
sumption sacrifices. However, the long-run Pareto efficiency resulting from the regime switch can generate
a cumulative consumption gain of 10 to 20 percent, after taking into account the short-lived consumption
losses and robustness checks. If instead the long-run suboptimal bounty rate of 0.15 is implemented, the
consumption gain is seen to diminish to 4.5 percent for the benchmark scenario. As expected, this subop-
timal bounty rate can only maintain the initial patent-regime R&D intensity of 0.0297, but is not intended
to internalize externalities. In sum, the entire dynamic general-equilibrium analysis delivers the central
message that an intertemporal bounty regime, where the prize for innovation is dynamically amortize in an
infinitely time domain, can be a Pareto-optimal alternative to the world’s long-standing patent system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out a patent-regime R&D-based growth
model featuring multiple distortions from patents, knowledge spillovers, and research congestion. Section 3
evaluates the patent regime against the model’s social planner optimum. Section 4 introduces an intertem-
13Solving a linearized dynamic system around the bounty-regime steady state would not make sense in the present paper, because
the patent-bounty regime switch represents a structural change that can lead to a bounty-regime steady state greatly differing from
the initial patent-regime steady state. This is especially true if the bounty rate is set at the long-run Pareto optimal level.
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poral bounty regime and the resulting four-dimensional dynamic system while deriving two formulas for the
long-run Pareto optimal and suboptimal bounty rates. Section 5 calibrates the model to the initial patent-
regime steady state that largely mimics an innovating economy like the United States and solves the dynamic
system numerically. Transition paths, welfare gains, and the robustness checks are computed and analyzed.
Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model for Patent Regime
In this paper I formulated a patent regime for a closed economy using a non-scale variety-expansion growth
model.14 This economy is endowed with labor L that grows exogenously. Labor and physical capital
are employed to produce final output Y , which can be used for consumption or for investment in either
durable (capital) goods X or R&D (research and development). Investing in durable goods X contributes
to the accumulation of physical capital K, while investing in R&D is to innovate technical designs for new
types of durable goods. Technical designs are indexed by i in a closed interval [0,V ] ⊂ R+. For each
design, the innovator receives a patent for a finite term denoted by T ∈ (0, ∞). Patents are tradeable and
perfectly enforced. Within the finite patent term, every patented firm has the exclusive power to produce
and sell a specific type of durable good X [i]. Yet, once a patent expires, the granted monopoly power
vanishes and the out-of-patent firm reduces to a perfectly competitive firm immediately. All durables are
horizontally differentiated. Variable V represents not only the number of patents that have been issued, but
also a measure of the variety of available durable goods. Like K measuring the stock of capital, V is a proxy
of the knowledge stock in the model. The growth of V allows for a finer division of capital and leads to an
increase in the level of TFP (total factor productivity) for the economy.
The model described below is for an economy that implements a patent system. It has four sectors
referred to as household, final good, durable (capital) good, and R&D.
14The model of the paper is a modification of Romer (1990) in three dimensions. First, patents are finitely lived. Second,
as in Rivera-Batiz and (1991), research input is from forgone consumption rather than from labor (human capital). Third, as in
Jones (1995), the R&D (innovation) function displays diminishing marginal returns to the research input, thereby removing the
empirically implausible scale effects. With these modifications, this model is closely related to Jones and Williams (2000) and
Eicher and Turnovsky (2001).
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2.1 Household
There is a continuum of identical households with measure of one in the economy. Each household has
L identical workers, which also represent the economy’s population of labor. The population of labor is
normalized to one at time t = 0 and is assumed to grow at an exogenous rate, n. So, the size of a typical
household at time t is given by L[t] = ent . DefineC[t] as the rate of the economy’s aggregate consumption of
final goods and c[t]≡ C[t]L[t] as the rate of per capita (or per worker) consumption at a point in time. For each
household, its family lifetime utilityU [t] at time t is given by
U [t] =
∞ˆ
t
￿
c[s− t]1−γ −1
1− γ
￿
e−(ρ−n)(s−t)ds, ρ > 0, γ > 0 (1)
where ρ and γ are two preference parameters with ρ measuring the rate of time preference and 1γ the elas-
ticity of intertemporal substitution. All labor services are used for final goods production. Each household
owns assets including physical capital and patents. Its per capita asset stock is a[t] at a point in time and earns
the net capital income of r[t]a[t] at the market rate of interest. From each household, every worker earns
wage income w[t] at a point in time from a perfectly competitive labor market. Hence, a typical household’s
flow budget constraint is given by
a˙[t]≡ da[t]
dt
= (r[t]−n)a[t]+w[t]− c[t] (2)
Households take as given all market prices such as w[t] and r[t]. From a household’s intertemporal opti-
mization, the familiar Euler condition is
cˆ[t]≡ c˙[t]
c[t]
=
r[t]−ρ
γ
. (3)
From (1) and (3), for the family lifetime utility to be bounded in the steady state, we invoke the parameter
constraint that ρ > n+ (1− γ)cˆ0, where cˆ0 represents a constant steady-state growth rate of per capita
consumption under a patent regime. Throughout the paper, an overdot defines a time derivative of the
associated variable and the symbol ^ indicates its instantaneous growth rate. Henceforth, the time variable t
will be suppressed in most equations unless otherwise necessary.
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2.2 Final goods
We chose final good Y as the numeraire. In the final goods sector there are many identical (competitive)
producers and the aggregate production function is given by
Y = L1−α
￿ˆ V
0
X [i]σαdi
￿1/σ
, 0< σ < 1
α
, (4)
where Y is the economy’s aggregate final output or real GDP produced with labor L supplied from house-
holds andV types of capital goods X [i] for i∈ [0,V ] that have been invented. As the functional form implies,
production of Y exhibits constant returns in labor and capital goods and these capital goods are imperfectly
substitutable. Each capital good, if patented, is priced at a markup equal to η ≡ 1σα > 1.15 Profit maximiza-
tion yields the following first-order conditions:
w= (1−α)Y/L (5a)
p[i] = αL1−α
￿ˆ V
0
X [i]σαdi
￿(1−σ)/σ
X [i]σα−1 (5b)
where p[i] is the price of capital good i, the fraction of 1−α in (5a) represents the labor share, and (5b) is
an inverse demand function for any capital good. This demand function implies that the price elasticity of
demand for each durable is equal to ε = 11−σα > 1. The markup for any patented durable is therefore given
by η = εε−1 =
1
σα > 1. As for out-of-patent (or unpatented) durables, they are priced at marginal cost.
Final output Y is allocated for consumption C, capital investment IK , and R&D investment IV . As Y
represents the economy’s real GDP, the national income identity requires
Y =C+S=C+ IK + IV (6)
where S is the flow of aggregate saving (or forgone consumption) and must be equal to IK+IV in equilibrium.
Define s ≡ SY = (Y −C)/Y as the saving rate, sK ≡ IKY as the the rate of capital investment, and sV ≡ IVY as
the rate of R&D investment (or called the economy’s R&D intensity). Then the flow equilibrium in saving
15If parameter σ were set equal to one, production function (4) would reduce to Romer’s (1990). As such, durables would
become neither substitutable nor complementary and the markup η ≡ 1σα would be 1α . In this paper, σ is less than 1/α so that the
markup η is allowed to deviate from the inverse of the capital share (α), as in Jones and Williams (2000) and Eicher and Turnovsky
(2001).
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and investment is given by
s= 1−C
Y
= sK + sV (7)
Investment in capital goods (IK) accumulates the stock of capital K, while investment in R&D (IV ) creates
new varieties of capital goods and raises the stock of knowledge V . The two stocks of the economy evolve
over time according to
K˙ ≡ dK
dt
= IK−δK = sKY −δK (8a)
V˙ ≡ dV
dt
= ξ IV = ξ sVY (8b)
where δ is the rate of capital depreciation and ξ is an endogenous measure of research productivity. In
contrast to physical capital, the stock of knowledge does not depreciate over time, as in most endogenous
growth models, whereas Eicher and Turnovsky (2001) introduce knowledge depreciation. The measure of
research productivity in (8b) is endogenously determined in terms of ξ = µV φ Iλ−1V , with µ > 0, 0 < φ <
φ¯ < 1, and 0< λ < 1. The parameter of µ is an exogenous technology term. The parameter of φ is positive
to capture the phenomenon of knowledge spillovers, but φ must be less than an upper bound φ¯ < 1 to ensure
a bounded long-run innovation rate, denoted by lim
t→∞Vˆ [t]<∞, where Vˆ ≡
V˙
V .
16 The parameter of λ is positive
but less than one, meaning that research input IV displays social diminishing marginal return on research
productivity. This captures the effect of research congestion, which may result from too many research firms
engaged in similar projects in patent races.
For simplicity, each unit of foregone consumption can presumably produce a unit of each type of capital
goods, so that the stock of capital is given by K =
´ V
0 X [i]di. Foregone consumption is partially invested
in R&D, thereby enabling the economy to introduce new types of durables over time. These new capital
goods are patentable as soon as they are invented. Active R&D therefore keeps changing the composition
of patented and unpatented durable goods under a patent system, as will be analyzed later. What follows
describes individual firms’ pricing behavior in the durable goods sector.
16From (8b), the instantaneous innovation rate is given by Vˆ = µV φ−1(sVY )λ . On a balanced-growth path, it can be shown that
the long-run steady-state innovation rate is determined by lim
t→∞Vˆ [t] =
λ
1−φ−λ/(εσ(1−α) , which is bounded and positive if and only if
φ < φ¯ ≡ 1−λ/[εσ(1−α)].
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2.3 Durable (capital) goods
Firms of capital goods may engage in monopolistic competition or perfect competition, depending on
whether or not they are under patent protection. As each unit of any type of durable goods requires one
unit of forgone consumption, r+δ measures the user cost of capital (interest rate plus capital depreciation).
Given p[i] (the rental price of durable i), p[i]− (r+ δ ) measures a firm’s unit profit. The profit function is
then given by
π[i] = (p[i]− r−δ )X [i], i ∈ [0,V ]. (9)
At any point in time, there are V firms (or V varieties of available durables) in the capital goods sector.
Of these available durable goods, there are Vp patented durables supplied by monopolistic firms and Vnp
unpatented (out-of-patent) durables by competitive firms. That is, V = Vp +Vnp. Patented durables are
priced at the markup of η ≡ 1σα > 1, while while unpatented ones obey marginal cost pricing. These pricing
conditions are given by
p[i] =

pnp = r+δ for i ∈ [0,Vnp]
pp = η(r+δ ) for i ∈ (Vnp,V ]
(10)
where pnp (= marginal cost) represents the competitive price of unpatented durables and pp the monopolistic
price of patented durables. From (10) and (5b), demands for patented and unpatented durables are related in
terms of:
Xnp = ηεXp (11)
where Xnp = X [i] for i ∈ [0,Vnp], Xp = X [i] for i ∈ (Vnp,V ], and Xnp > Xp due to ηε > 1. That is, on a
per-durable basis, the economy uses more of an unpatented capital good than a patented one, since each
patented durable costs more (pp > pnp). Define ζ ≡ VpV as the fraction of patented durables and 1−ζ ≡ VnpV
as the fraction for unpatented durables. Then one can use (11) to derive the stock of capital,
K =
ˆ V
0
X [i]di=VXnp(η−εζ +1−ζ ) (12)
Note that equation (12) actually represents a market clearing condition for capital goods, because K is the
stock of forgone consumption borrowed to purchase both patented and unpatented durables.
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2.4 Innovation under a patent system
This subsection discusses the innovation function (8b) and explains how the R&D-driven innovation rate
interacts with the dynamic evolution from patented to unpatented durables over time, given that patents are
finitely lived.
2.4.1 Innovation, patent value, and R&D intensity
In the research sector there is a stream of identical firms with measure of one. The innovation function
(8b) thus applies to the entire economy and any individual research firm as well. Under perfect competition
research firms borrow forgone consumption to develop new designs for capital goods. At the firm level,
research input IV and the flow V˙ of capital-good designs are linearly related, since the research productivity
measure of ξ in (8b) is taken as given in an individual research firm’s decision problem. Under a patent
system, the flow of new designs V˙ dt during an instant means the flow of newly issued patents and each of
these patents has a finite patent term denoted by T > 0. Each newly issued patent gives birth to a new firm
producing a new type of capital goods. Patents are tradable. The market for patents is perfectly competitive.
The price υ of a fresh patent issued at time t must reflect its future profitability during an entire patent life.
Hence,
υ [t] =
ˆ t+T
t
e−R[τ]π[τ]dτ (13)
where R[τ] ≡ ´ τt r[ω]dω is the cumulative sum of interest rates from t to τ and π measures the profit flow
to any firm holding a legally live patent (see (9)). As such, a fresh patent’s market price reflects the private
value or shadow price of a potential innovation under the patent regime. The vintage of a live patent has no
effects on the profit flow. Under non-arbitrage conditions, the equilibrium price of a fresh patent must match
the cost of developing a new design. That is,
υ [t] = 1/ξ [t]≡ 1/
￿
µV [t]φ (IV [t])λ−1
￿
(14)
where the inverse of ξ [t] measures the development cost according to (8b).17 If υ > 1/ξ there would be
unbounded R&D demand for foregone consumption. If υ < 1/ξ , there would be unbounded demand for
patents. With well functioning markets, equilibrium R&D investment IV must be such that the price of fresh
17The research input of IV generates V˙ patents at time t. So, the present-time cost of developing a patent (or a new design) is
measured by IV /V˙ = 1/ξ in terms of (8b).
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patents equals the cost of capital-good innovation and determines the instantaneous rate of innovation,
Vˆ ≡ V˙
V
= µV φ−1IλV , (15)
using (8b). With the identity of V =Vp+Vnp, the innovation rate Vˆ is a weighted average of the growth rate
Vˆp of patented durables and the growth rate Vˆnp of unpatented durables. That is, Vˆ = ζVˆp+(1−ζ )Vˆnp with
Vˆp ≡ V˙pVp and Vˆnp ≡
V˙np
Vnp , where the fraction of patented durables ζ ≡ VP/V and the fraction of unpatented
durables 1−ζ =Vnp/V evolve over time until the economy is in a steady state. The patent length T plays a
role in the motions of ζ , Vp, and Vnp. We describe their relationships in what follows.
2.4.2 Patent length and the dynamic evolution from patented to unpatented durables
First, with an active R&D sector, there are V˙ [t] patents issued at a point in time and these newly issued
patents will expire at a future date, t+T . That is, it holds that V˙ [t] = V˙np[t+T ] and this equality relation
implies V˙np[t] = V˙ [t−T ]. As such, V˙np[t] is pre-determined by previous innovations at a time of t−T . With
a finite patent length, the growth rates of unpatented and patented durables are therefore given by18
Vˆnp[t] =
￿
1
1−ζ [t]
￿
Vˆ [t−T ]e−
´ t−
t−T Vˆ [τ]dτ (16a)
Vˆp[t] =
￿
1
ζ [t]
￿
(Vˆ [t]−Vˆ [t−T ]e−
´ t−
t−T Vˆ [τ]dτ) (16b)
where t− is asymptotically close to t and
´ t−
t−T Vˆ [τ]dτ represents the cumulative sum of innovation rates
between t−T and t. Differentiating ζ ≡ VpV with respect to time t yields
ζ˙ [t] = (Vˆp[t]−Vˆ [t])ζ [t] (17)
As indicated, ζ˙ > 0 if the growth rate of patented durables, Vˆp , exceeds the innovation rate, Vˆ . If it is the
case, there is an increase in the fraction of patented durables and a decrease in the fraction of unpatented
durables. From (17), ζ is driven by the two motions of Vˆ and Vˆp in terms of (17). These motions underlie
the patent-created innovating mechanism in a dynamic general-equilibrium context. This mechanism con-
18(16a) can be obtained using: (i) V˙np[t] = V˙ [t−T ], (ii) Vˆnp[t]≡ V˙np[t]Vnp[t] =
V˙ [t−T ]
V [t−T ]× V [t−T ]V [t] × V [t]Vnp[t] , (iii)
V [t]
Vnp =
1
1−ζ [t] , and (iv)V [t] =
V [t−T ]e
´ t−
t−T Vˆ [τ]dτ , where the upper bound t− is asymptotically close to t. Then with (16a) and the identity Vˆ = ζVˆp+(1−ζ )Vˆnp,
(16b) holds evidently.
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tributes to total factor productivity (TFP) by introducing new types of capital goods, but it can also induce a
technical distortion to offset the TFP enhancement to some extent. The following analysis will unfold this
problem.
2.5 Innovation and monopoly distortion
In the model patents incentivize innovation of new capital goods by creating monopoly distortions. In this
environment, the relative prices of patented and unpatented capital goods are distorted and prevent society
from adopting the technically optimal mix of durables, although individual final goods producers always
choose their cost-minimizing techniques for whatever relative prices. This problem is missing in almost all
endogenous growth models where patents are presumed to be infinitely lived.
2.5.1 Monopoly-distorted TFP
Consider symmetries of capital goods permitting to use Xnp for X [i], i ∈ [0,Vnp] and Xp for X [i], i ∈ (Vnp,V ].
From (11) and (12), the final goods production function can reduce to :
Y = F [L, K; A, z, α, ] = z(AL)1−αKα (18)
where A ≡ V 1εσ(1−α) is an endogenous technology term, zA1−α ( = zV 1εσ ) is a measure of TFP, and z is the
monopoly-induced technical distortion term defined as
z= z[ζ ] =
￿
η1−εζ +1−ζ￿1/σ
(η−εζ +1−ζ )α (19)
It can be verified that z bears a convex relationship with ζ ∈ [0,1], has a local minimum at ζ = ε([1−
( 1η )
ε ]−1− ( 1η )[1− ( 1η )ε−1]−1)> 0, and rises to one if ζ moves to either end of its domain. This relationship
is demonstrated in Figure 1, which presumes α = 1/3 and σ = 1.75 or 2.00.19. Note that the socially
optimal technique for final goods production ought to involve symmetric use of all available capital goods
in accordance with (4). But under the patent regime the relative prices of patented and unpatented durables
are distorted, causing final goods producers’ use of capital goods biased toward those that are marginal cost
19Recall that 0 < σ < 1α , ε =
1
1−σα > 1, η =
1
σα > 1, and 0 < ζ < 1. Given these parameters and (19), if ζ = 1, z =
η(1−ε)/σ+εα = 1 due to (1− ε)/σ + εα = 0. As well, if ζ = 0, the result of z = 1 is self-evident. Certainly, both z and ζ are
determined simultaneously in equilibrium.
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Figure 1: The convex relationship between z and ζ =Vp/V
priced. This bias gives rise to a socially inefficient technique in production of final goods and translates into
an economy-wide drag on the level of TFP (due to zA1−α < A1−α ). Thus, TFP fails to attain its potential
level (= A1−α ), unless patents are either infinitely lived (T → ∞) or non-existent (T = 0). In the latter case,
the R&D sector must vanish, however. R&D-based growth models often presume perpetual patents (T →∞,
ζ = 1) and therefore ignore a finitely-lived patent’s negative effects on the level of TFP. For instance, these
models include Romer (1990), Jones (1995), Jones and Williams (2000), and Eicher and Turnovsky (2001).
2.5.2 Monopoly-distorted factor income shares
Next, let us look at how factor income shares are influenced by monopoly distortions. Consider the flow of
gross capital income
´ V
0 p[i]X [i]di that can be decomposed into aggregate (gross) rental income (r+δ )K and
aggregate profit Π=Vpπ = ζVπ , where ζV is the number of patented firms. The labor share is wLY = 1−α ,
so parameter α represents the gross capital income share and must satisfy the identity relationship that
14
α = ΠY +
(r+δ )K
Y , where the shares of profit and gross rental income are given by
20
Π
Y
= mα, with m= ζ (η−1)
(1−ζ )ηε +ζη ∈ (0, 1) (20a)
(r+δ )K
Y
= (1−m)α (20b)
Note that the fraction term m determines how much of the the gross capital income share, α , goes to mo-
nopolistic profits. Certainly, (1−m)α is the remaining capital income share going for rents and capital
depreciation, subject to the relative magnitude of r and δ . Since ∂m∂ζ = η
ε > 0, the profit share, Π/Y , rises if
patented firms account for a larger fraction in the entire capital goods sector. If this fraction is one (ζ = 1),
the profit share reaches its maximum at
￿
η−1
η
￿
α and the gross rental share drops to its minimum at αη . To
the contrary, ζ = 0 (no monopoly) dictates that the entire capital share, α , goes for gross rents.
2.6 Patent regime’s steady-state dynamic system
The patent-regime economy is in the steady state by assumption. Let us close the patent regime model
by presenting its balanced-growth dynamic system and its core variables’ steady state equilibrium in this
subsection. Later the economy will be perturbed at time t = 0 by replacing the patent regime with an
intertemporal-bounty (IB) regime. To differentiate one regime from the other other, let us label the initial
patent steady state with subscript 0 and a new IB steady state with subscript 1. From (8a), (8b), (3), and (13),
the patent-regime dynamic system on a balanced-growth path is represented by four ordinary differential
equations:21
K˙0[t] = (1− sV0)Y0[t]−C0[t]−δK0[t] (21a)
V˙0[t] = µV0[t]φ (sV0Y0[t])λ (21b)
C˙0[t] =C0
￿
r−ρ
γ
+n
￿
(21c)
υ˙0[t] = r0υ0[t]−π0[t](1− e−(r0−πˆ0)T ) (21d)
20Aggregate profit is Π = ζVπ = (η − 1)(r+ δ )ζVXp based on (9) and (10) and aggregate rental income is (r+ δ )K = (r+
δ )VXnp
￿
η−εζ +1−ζ￿ according to (12). Hence, using (11), the ratio of Π/[(r+ δ )K] is determined by ζ (η−1)ζ+(1−ζ )ηε . Using this
ratio, we can solve the identity α = ΠY +
(r+δ )K
Y for (20a) and (20b).
21By Leibniz’s rule, differentiating (13) on a balanced growth path yields the differential equation of (21d).
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whereY0[t] = z0(A0[t]L[t])1−αKα0 and π0[t] =αm0Y0[t]/ζ0V0[t] according to (18) and (20a). On the balanced-
growth path, the non-stationary variables including K0[t], V0[t], Y0[t],C0[t], υ0[t], and π0[t] continue to grow
over time at their constant growth rates. In contrast, the stationary variables such as interest rate r0, R&D
investment rate sV0, capital investment rate sK0, and patented durables share ζ0 all stay unchanged over
time. For those non-stationary variables, their constant steady-state growth rates are given as follows (see
Appendix A for derivations):
Kˆ0 = Yˆ0 = Cˆ0 = θKn (22a)
Vˆ0 = θVn; Aˆ0 = θAn (22b)
υˆ0 = πˆ0 = θυn≡ (θK−θV )n (22c)
where each of terms θV , θA, θK and θυ is a structural composite of growth-relevant parameters for a specific
variable or for a set of specific variables, as given below,
θV =
λ
1−φ −λ/[εσ(1−α)] ; θA =
λ
(1−φ)[εσ(1−α)]−λ ; θK = θA+1= (
1−φ
λ
)θV . (23)
To facilitate subsequent discussions, let us call these structural composites “growth kernels,” which readily
translate the population growth rate n into a relevant variable’s long-run growth rate. For instance, θVn is the
long-run innovation rate of V , θAn the long-run growth rate of A, and θKn the long-run growth rate of K, Y ,
and C.22 Certainly, on per capita terms, (θK−1)n (= θAn) determines the long-run growth rate of k, y, and
c due to kˆ= Kˆ−n, yˆ= Yˆ −n and cˆ= Cˆ−n. As for a fresh patent’s price υ and a patented firm’s profit flow
π , they share the same growth kernel represented by θυ (or θK minus θV ), and thereby their long-run growth
rate is given by θυn or (θK−θV )n, as indicated by (22c). This actually makes intuitive sense, because final
output growth (θKn) expands the market for capital goods, whereas the arrival of newer capital goods (θVn)
dilutes the market.
Note that the structural parameters (α , σ , ε λ , φ ) that form the growth kernels are from the production
functions of final goods and technical designs of capital goods. The population growth rate n is a parameter,
too. Therefore, the long-run innovation rate Vˆ0 and all other long-run growth rates mentioned above are
exogenous, independent of the size of the economy and the patent length. Also, as noted earlier (see Footnote
16), a bounded, positive long-run innovation rate, Vˆ0, requires that φ be less than the upper bound φ¯ (=
22The economy’s long-run TFP growth rate is determined by (1−α)θAn in terms of (18).
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1−λ/[εσ(1−α)]< 1). Once Vˆ0 is bounded, all other non-stationary variables are bounded as well.
In the model ongoing growth makes non-stationary variables unbounded and grow exponentially at
different paces in the long run. These features call for multiple normalization factors to transform non-
stationary into stationary variables. The “growth-kernel powered labor forces” defined by LθK , LθV , LθA and
LθK−θV provide a systemic way to build such normalization factors. For instance, K, V , A and υ can be
normalized to ￿K ≡ K/LθK , ￿V ≡V/LθV , ￿A≡ A/LθA , and ￿υ ≡ υ/Lθυ , respectively. In so doing, each variable
with tilde is a bounded, measurable scale-adjusted quantity, because ￿ˆx[t] = xˆ[t]−θxn = 0, x ∈ {K,V, A, υ}
as t goes to infinity.23 We close the patent regime model by deriving the long-run steady-state equilibria of
a set of scale-adjusted variables for further analysis (see Appendix A for detailed derivations):
￿K0 = ￿A0￿ z0sK0δ +θKn
￿1/(1−α)
(24a)
￿V0 = ￿sV0￿ z0sK0δ +θKn
￿α/(1−α)￿ µ
θVn
￿1/λ￿θV
(24b)
￿C0 = (1− s0)￿Y0 (24c)
￿υ0 = αm0ζ0
￿￿Y0￿V0
￿￿
1− e−(r0−Yˆ0+Vˆ0)T
r0− Yˆ0+Vˆ0
￿
(24d)
where
sK0 = α(1−m0)
￿
δ +n+ Aˆ0
r0+δ
￿
, (24e)
sV0 = Vˆ0
￿
αm0
ζ0
￿￿
1− e−(r0−Yˆ0+Vˆ0)T
r0− Yˆ0+Vˆ0
￿
, (24f)
r0 = ρ+ γAˆ0, (24g)
ζ0 = 1− e−Vˆ0T , (24h)
In the above equations, our earlier definitions suffice to recognize that ￿A0 = ￿V 1/(εσ(1−α))0 is a scale-adjusted
technology term, ￿Y0 = z0￿A1−α0 ￿Kα0 is a scale-adjusted GDP, z0 is a monopoly-induced technical distortion on
TFP (see (19), s0 ≡ sK0+ sV0 is the steady-state saving rate, α(1−m0) is the gross rental income share, and
23Similar normalization factors are used in Eicher and Turnovsky (2001).
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αm0 is the profit share (see (20a).24 On the initial balanced growth path, a patented firm’s scale-adjusted
profit flow is ￿π0 = αm0ζ0 ￿ ￿Y0￿V0￿, and with the finite patent length T and the discount factor 1−e−(r0−Yˆ0+Vˆ0)Tr0−Yˆ0+Vˆ0 , ￿υ0 is a
measure of the scale-adjusted private value (shadow price) of a potential innovation according to (24d). This
private value represents a discounted sum of the profit stream earned by a newly issued patent. It permits
to derive the R&D intensity sV0 in (24f) as shown in Appendix A. Equations (24a) - (24h) imply the roles
of patent length (T ) and patent-created monopoly distortions (z0, m0). For instance, if patent length T is
set to zero, then: (i) the monopolistically competitive sector vanishes (ζ0 = 0); (ii) there is no TFP growth
(Vˆ0 = Aˆ0 = 0) despite that there is no monopoly distortion on TFP (z0 = 1, see Figure 1); (iii) the profit
share is zero due to m0 = 0, so are the R&D intensity (sV0 = 0), the private value of a potential innovation
(￿υ0 = 0), and the scale-adjusted knowledge stock (￿V0 = 0). In other words, if the patent system is removed
and if there is no other decentralized market mechanism to support R&D investment, the model becomes a
non-innovative economy can only invest in old capital goods endowed by history.
The paper is aimed at examining whether or not it is socially desirable to replace the entire patent regime
with an intertemporal bounty regime that will be laid out later in Section 4. To this end, it is conductive to
evaluate the patent regime and the proposed alternative, respectively, against the economy’s Pareto optimal-
ity. The next section evaluates the patent regime.
3 Evaluating Patent Regime against Pareto Optimality
How efficient is a decentralized patent-regime economy in allocating resources? To answer this question,
we need look at the economy’s Pareto optimal allocation as a benchmark.
3.1 Pareto optimality
The Pareto optimal allocation can be obtained by maximizing household’s lifetime utility, subject to the
economy’s initial resource endowments (K0, V0, L0 = 1) and technological constraints. Hence, the social
planner optimization problem is given by
max
c, IK , IV
∞ˆ
0
c1−γ −1
1− γ e
−(ρ−n)tdt, s.t.: (25a)
24A=V
1
εσ(1−α) implies ￿A= ￿V 1εσ(1−α) using A= ￿ALθA , V = ￿VLθV , and θVεσ(1−α) −θA = 0; see (23).
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Y = (AL)1−αKα =C+ IK + IV , C = cL (25b)
K˙ = IK−δK, K[0] = K0; V˙ = µV φ IλV , V [0] =V0 (25c)
where L[t] = ent . With no market imperfections in such a centralized economy, we need to set ζ at ζ ∗ = 0
and z at z∗ = 1.25 This makes final goods production function (18) reduce to (25b). We can solve the
social planner problem for c, IK , and IV , which can then translate into s, sK , sV , and υ respectively.26 Using
these Pareto-optimal investment rates, we can derive the Pareto-optimal scale-adjusted stocks of capital and
knowledge in the same way as we did earlier for the patent regime. Also, as we have analyzed, the long-run
growth rates of some non-stationary variables are parametrized by their associated growth kernels and the
population growth rate (see (22a) - (22c)). Certainly, these long-run growth rates also hold for the centralized
economy; that is, Kˆ∗ = Yˆ ∗ = Cˆ∗ = θKn, Vˆ ∗ = θVn, Aˆ∗ = θAn, and υˆ∗ = πˆ∗ = (θK−θV )n. However, except
for the real interest rate r, the centralized economy has a different set of steady-state equilibria given below:
￿K∗ = ￿A∗￿ s∗K
δ +n+ Aˆ∗
￿1/(1−α)
(26a)
￿V ∗ = ￿s∗V ￿ s∗Kδ +θKn
￿α/(1−α)￿ µ
θVn
￿1/λ￿θV
(26b)
￿C∗ = (1− s∗)￿Y ∗ (26c)
￿υ∗ = 1
εσ
￿￿Y ∗￿V ∗
￿￿
λ
r∗ − Yˆ ∗+(1−φ)Vˆ ∗
￿
(26d)
where
s∗K = α ·
￿
δ +n+ Aˆ∗
r∗+δ
￿
(26e)
s∗V = Vˆ
∗
￿
1
εσ
￿￿
λ
r∗ − Yˆ ∗+(1−φ)Vˆ ∗
￿
(26f)
r∗ = r0, ζ ∗ = 0 (26g)
25Hereafter, a variable with an asterisk indicates a centralized economy’s steady-state equilibrium.
26As a standard procedure, one can obtain the socially optimal solution by maximizing the Hamiltonian,
H ≡
￿
c1−γ −1
1− γ
￿
e−(ρ−n)t +ψK ·
￿
V
1
εσ L1−αKα − cL− IV −δK
￿
+ψV ·µV φ IλV
where ψK and ψV are Lagrangian multipliers.
19
In these socially optimal equations, ￿Y ∗ = ￿A∗1−α ￿K∗α , ￿A∗ = ￿V ∗1/(εσ(1−α)) and s∗K + s∗V = s∗. Equation (26d)
merit special attention.27 There, the term 1εσ =
V
Y
∂Y
∂V =
V
TFP
∂TFP
∂V measures the elasticity of final output
Y or total factor productivity TFP with respect to the measure of variety V in terms of (18), while the
term λr∗−Yˆ ∗+(1−φ)Vˆ ∗ is the discount factor that takes into account the externalities of knowledge spillovers
φ and research congestion λ . Thus in this steady-state centralized economy, ￿υ∗is the scale-adjusted social
value of an individual innovation and ￿υ∗￿V ∗the scale-adjusted social value of aggregate innovations, each in
present-value term. Note that the term of ε = 11−σα (with 0< σ < 1/α) is the price elasticity of demand for
individual capital goods. This implies that if “innovative” capital goods are very similar (i.e. ε approaches
infinity), then the social value ￿υ∗ of an innovation approaches zero due to 1εσ → 0. In this polar case, the
socially optimal R&D intensity s∗V drops to zero, so is the scale-adjusted socially optimal knowledge capital.
3.2 Patent regime is suboptimal
To show that a patent-regime economy is always suboptimal, we use (24a) - (24h) and (26a) - (26g) to derive
the following relative ratios: ￿K0￿K∗ =
￿ ￿V0￿V ∗
￿1/[εσ(1−α)]￿
z0sK0
s∗K
￿1/(1−α)
(27a)
￿V0￿V ∗ =
￿
sV0
s∗V
￿θV ￿z0sK0
s∗K
￿αθV /(1−α)
(27b)
￿υ0￿V0￿υ∗￿V ∗ =
￿
sV0
s∗V
￿￿ ￿K0￿K∗
￿α￿ ￿V0￿V ∗
￿ 1
εσ
(27c)
sK0
s∗K
= 1−m0 (27d)
sV0
s∗V
=
￿
αm0/ζ0
1/(εσ)
￿￿
1− e−(r0−Yˆ0+Vˆ0)T
1
￿￿
1/(r0− Yˆ0+Vˆ0)
1/[r0− Yˆ0+(1−φ)Vˆ0]
￿￿
1
λ
￿
(27e)
It is clear from (27a) that as long as there is a non-zero patent length (T > 0), patent-regime agents must
underinvest in the capital stock (because sK0s∗K < 1 due to 0 < m0 < 1). The market mechanism is straight-
27In a centralized economy, there are no bounty claims. But in this economy the shadow price υ∗ of innovations must satisfy
υ∗ = s
∗
VY ∗
V˙ ∗ =
s∗VY ∗
Vˆ ∗V ∗ , which implies ￿υ∗ = s∗V ￿Y ∗Vˆ ∗￿V ∗ using υ = ￿υLθυ , Y = ￿YLθK , V = ￿VLθV , and θυ = θK − θV according to (22c).
Replacing s∗V with (26f), we can obtain (26d).
20
forward: patent-created monopolies raise capital-good prices above marginal costs and decrease the market
incentive to build the stock of capital. Further, as we had mentioned earlier, there is a monopoly-induced
technical distortion, denoted by z0, this can decrease the economy’s total factor productivity (see (19)). As a
result, through the sK0− cum− z0 channel, the patent-regime capital and knowledge stocks must fall below
their respective long-run Pareto optimal levels, as indicated by (27a) and (27b).
Further, through the sV0 channel, the patent-regime capital and knowledge stocks can be affected as well.
However, this channel is more complicated. For purposes of exposition, we break the R&D-intensity ratio
sV0/s∗V of equation (27e) into four sources:
(i) From the first parenthesized term, a patent-protected monopolist’s valuation of an innovation is al-
ways less than social valuation at any point in time; i.e. αm0/ζ0 < 1/(εσ).28 This is a static valuation
distortion, making patent-regime agents underinvest in R&D. (ii) From the second term, patent-regime
agents underinvest in R&D again, because a finite patent length is always too short to reflect an innovative
durable’s permanent contribution to household’s welfare. This is a dynamic valuation distortion inherent in
any patent system that rewards an innovation only for a finite duration. The static and dynamic valuation
distortions combine to create the well-known “social-surplus appropriability” problem. (iii) The third term
represents a positive technical externality, making patent-regime agents underinvest in R&D, because they
do not internalize knowledge spillovers (0 < φ < 1) in their private R&D decisions (see (8b)). (iv) Lastly,
from the fourth term, 1/λ is greater than one, due to the research congestion externality (λ < 1) (see (8b)).
For this negative technical externality, patent-regime agents overinvest in R&D. In contrast to patent-regime
agents, the social planner internalizes both positive and negative externalities.
The above analysis indicates multiple distortions that tend to cause underinvestment in R&D in a de-
centralized patent-regime economy, whereas only the research-congestion distortion tends to the opposite.
Empirical estimates seem to suggest that the research-congestion distortion alone should not dominate.29
Thus, compared to the Pareto optimum, the patent regime should tend to have a smaller R&D intensity (sV0)
and should tend to build a smaller stock of capital and knowledge, respectively, on account of (27a) and
(27b). Another important feature that merits attention is that in general the Pareto-optimal social value ￿υ∗ of
28The private valuation of a patented capital good is αm0/ζ0 = α
￿
η−1
(1−ζ )ηε+ζη
￿
=
￿
ζη
(1−ζ )ηε+ζη
￿
·α/ε according to (20a) and
η = ε/(ε−1) > 1. Since ζη(1−ζ )ηε+ζη < 1 and α < 1σ from (4), the private valuation must be unambiguously less than the social
valuation.
29For instance, Jones and Williams (1998) find that an innovating economy’s socially optimal R&D investment is at least four
time greater than actual spending.
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an innovation may or may not exceed its patent-regime private ￿υ0, because each of these two values is tied
to the cost of value-created R&D in a general equilibrium framework. This is in contrast to previous partial
equilibrium patent-prize studies. But it is clear that if the research congestion externality (λ < 1) does not
dominate, the Pareto social value of aggregate innovations are greater than their corresponding social value
according to ￿υ0￿V0￿υ∗￿V ∗ < 1 (see (27c)).30
Simulation of the model later will lend support to our analysis here. Regardless, a patent system is
apparently suboptimal, with no hope to duplicate the social planner’s optimal solution.31
4 Switching to the Intertemporal Bounty Regime
Can a decentralized economy attain the Pareto optimum characterized by (26a) - (26g) if the patent regime
is replaced with an alternative that rewards technological innovation with intertemporal bounties payable on
the observed marginal-cost sales of bountiable goods? This is the central question of the paper. To facilitate
the analysis, I firstly describe institutional arrangements for the intertemporal bounty (IB) regime to be a
patent replacement.
4.1 Institutional arrangements
A feasible intertemporal bounty regime requires the following institutional arrangements:32
First, any bountiable innovation of a differentiated capital good must be freely licensed. This creates
a free entry condition to establish a perfectly competitive market for bountiable durables that must sell at
marginal cost. That is, p= r+δ with η = 1 (see (10)).
Second, the innovator is rewarded with a perpetual bounty claim to an infinite stream of future bounties,
payable on the ex post marginal-cost sales of a specific bountiable capital good at a rate determined by the
government. The number of bountiable goods is the same as the number of bounty claims. Denote by β the
bounty rate. Then given the ex post market sales pX of the bountiable good, the bounty flow, denoted by
b, is paid to the holder of a bounty claim at a point in time based on b = β pX . In this way, the prize for
30Note that at any point in time some there are newly issued patents plus vintage patents that have either expired or not yet
expired. But ￿υ0 is the scale-adjusted private value of a new patent. Therefor, ￿υ0￿V0 has overestimated the actual private value of
aggregate innovations.
31For instance, if the patent length goes to infinity (T → ∞), z0 → 1, ζ0 → 1, m0 → (η − 1)/η = 1/ε , and αm0/ζ01/(εσ) → σα < 1.
These changes only mitigate to some extent the monopoly-created distortions. Adjusting the patent breadth (equivalent to changing
the markup rate, η) cannot fix the sub-optimality problem, either.
32See Footnote 11 for earlier discussions of the IB system.
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innovation is dynamically amortized in an infinite time domain as periodic bounties b, subject to the bounty
rate β and observed market sales pX . The IB system therefore releases the burden of estimating the size
of prizes. Of course, the government still needs to estimate the bounty rate β , which we will show how
to calculate using mostly aggregate data. As discussed in the introductory section, the IB system is more
practical than those “once and for all” prize systems from the patent-prize economics literature.
Third, the government collects taxes from households to make bounty payments. For simplicity, the
paper presumes a non-distortionary lump-sum tax available to fund such intertemporal bounties. The tax-
financed bounty payment must be creditable so as to form an active asset market for tradeable bounty
claims.33 The equilibrium price υ of a typical bounty claim must therefore reflect the discounted present
value of an infinite stream of future bounties. Thus the equilibrium bounty-claim price, υ , informs the
government and private agents of the private value of a bountiable innovation (blueprint). Households are
the owners of bounty claims. So, the collected lump-sum tax must return to the household sector.
Fourth, the intertemporal-bounty regime grandfathers all those previously innovated durables whose
patents are still legally live at the moment of the regime switch, which occurs at t = 0 in the modeled
economy with live patents amounting to Vp[0] = ζ0V [0]. Thus, at t = 0, the government needs to issue
ζ0V [0] bounty claims immediately, and variable ζ would henceforth need to be redefined as the fraction of
bountied ( not patented) durables. Eliminating the grandfather clause would allow bounties and patents to
co-exist before these patents expire legally. This would complicate the model and delay the gain to society
from removing monopolies.
Under the above arrangements, all capital goods, either bountied or non-bountied, sell at the same
marginal cost. This simplifies calculation of bounties. The government’s aggregate bounty payments, de-
noted by B, at a point in time are equal to B = βαYζ = β (r+ δ )Kζ , where αY = (r+ δ )K is aggregate
capital spending and αYζ is aggregate markets sales of bountiable goods. That is, the government needs
to collect from households a lump-sum tax equal to B. Certainly, the bounty flow to an individual bounty
claim is determined by b = B/ζV = βαY/V , where ζV is the number of bounty claims. In what follows
the patent-regime model we have developed earlier will be switched to a bounty-regime model. This can be
done by changing some parameters.
33In practice, a bounty claim can split into shares to make it more liquid on the market.
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4.2 Dynamic system under the intertemporal bounty regime
Now, for the modeled economy to enter an intertemporal-bounty regime, we change some parameters that
characterize the patent-regime model. To this end, the markup of η > 1 is changed to η = 1, the monopoly
profit flow π is replaced with the bounty flow b, and a finite patent length T < ∞ is re-parametrized as
an infinite bounty length with T → ∞.34 In so doing, we can parametrize a regime switch from patents
to intertemporal bounties. This regime switch pushes the economy off the initial patent-regime balanced-
growth path defined by (21a) - (21d) and gives rise to a bounty-regime dynamic system that evolves over
time t ∈ [0, ∞) as given below:
K˙[t] = (1− sV [t])Y [t]−C[t]−δK[t] (28a)
V˙ [t] = µV [t]φ (sV [t]Y [t])λ (28b)
C˙[t] =C[t](
r[t]−ρ
γ
+n) (28c)
υ˙ [t] = r[t]υ [t]−b[t] (28d)
where Y [t], sV [t], r[t] and b[t] are determined by
Y [t] = (A[t]L[t])1−αK[t]α (29a)
sV [t] = υ [t]1/(1−λ )(µV [t]φ )1/(1−λ )/Y [t] (29b)
r[t] =
αY [t]
K[t]
−δ (29c)
b[t] = βαY [t]/V [t] (29d)
ζ [t] = 1− (1−ζ0)e−
´ t
0 Vˆ [τ]dτ , ζ [0] = ζ0, ζ [∞] = 1 (29e)
34The bounty regime requires T → ∞ because bounty claims are perpetual. For the flow budget constraint (2), per-capita lump-
sum tax needs to be included so that a˙ = (r−n)a+w− c− BL , where asset stock a (including physical capital and bounty claims)
earns net capital income (consisting of the bounty flow) at an interest rate r on risk-free bonds. With no uncertainty, bonds and
other types of assets are perfect substitutes. Atomistic household treat the lump sum tax B as given in their intertemporal decisions.
Also, we need to re-interpret pp (pnp) as the price of bountied (unbountied) durables, and Vp (Vnp) as the number of bountied
(unbountied) durables.
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This is a nonlinear dynamic system of four first-order ordinary differential equations. This system starts at
t = 0, driving the economy to transition to a new balanced-growth path in the long run. It contains new
elements that warrant attention in some respects:
First, in contrast to (21d), (28d) is a no-arbitrage condition applying to infinitely lived bounty claims,
where υ [t] is reinterpreted as the market price of a bounty claim (not a patent) and b[t] is the bounty flow to
the holder of a typical bounty claim. Second, the bounty flow b[t] is based on the government-determined
bounty rate β and the observed market size of a bountied durable, αY [t]/V [t], according to (29d). Third, the
TFP-distortion term z jumps to one as η is set to one at the moment of the regime switch, thereby raising
TFP to the distortion-free level, as implied by (29a). Fourth, using (14) and sVY = IV , one can readily
derive (29b) to determine the R&D investment rate sV [t]. Fifth, setting m= 0 (due to η = 1) in (20b) yields
equation (29c) for the interest rate r[t] at any moment. Lastly, (29e) determines the fraction ζ [t] of bountied
durables. This is a state variable evolving to one in the long run, subject to the instantaneous innovation
Vˆ = V˙/V determined by the the dynamic system. But this state variable does not enter the dynamic system,
since bountied and unbountied durables are equally priced.35
To examine how the regime switch is to impact the economy, we must solve the dynamic system of
(28a) - (28d) for a nonlinear stable manifold in the two-dimensional state space of capital and knowledge
stocks. This is tantamount to computing the transition paths of K[t], V [t],C[t] and υ [t], t ∈ [0, ∞). But these
variables are unbounded in the long run. Thus as under the initial patent regime, the bounty-regime dynamic
system must be transformed into a stationary one.
4.3 Normalization of bounty-regime dynamic system
Normalizing the dynamic system of (28a) - (28d) requires four normalization factors, as we did for the
patent regime. More details are given in what follows.
4.3.1 Growth kernel-powered labor forces as normalization factors
Note that long-run growth rates are regime-independent in the model. They are parametrized by their asso-
ciated growth kernels (θV , θA, θK , θυ ) and the population growth rate (n) in accordance with (22a) - (22c)
and (23). As under the patent regime, these growth kernel-powered labor forces (LθK , LθV , LθA , Lθυ ) serve
35Perpetual bounty claims implies V˙p = V˙ and Vˆp = VVp
V˙
V = Vˆ/ζ . Therefore, (17) needs to be changed to ζ˙ = (1−ζ )Vˆ , which
solves for 29e.
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as normalization factors such that ￿K = K/LθK , ￿V =V/LθV , ￿A= A/LθA , ￿C =C/LθK , ￿Y =Y/LθK , ￿υ = υ/Lθυ ,
and ￿b = b/Lθυ .36 These scale-adjusted quantities (￿K, ￿V , ￿A, ￿C, ￿Y , ￿υ , ￿b) are stationary and measurable as t
goes to infinity. Using this normalization approach and noting how those growth kernels are interrelated in
terms of (23), we can transform (28a) - (28d) into a stationary dynamic system as given below:
￿˙K[t] = f1[￿ω[t]]≡ sK [t]￿Y [t]− (δ +θKn)￿K[t] (30a)
￿˙V [t] = f2[￿ω[t]]≡ µ￿V [t]φ (sV [t]￿Y [t])λ −θVn￿V [t] (30b)
￿˙C[t] = f3[￿ω[t]]≡ ￿C[t](r[t]−ργ −θAn) (30c)
￿˙υ [t] = f4[￿ω[t]]≡ r[t]￿υ [t]−￿b[t]− (θK−θV )n￿υ [t] (30d)
subject to ￿K[0] = ￿K0, ￿V [0] = ￿V0; ￿K[∞] = ￿K1, ￿V [∞] = ￿V1, ￿C[∞] = ￿C1, ￿υ [∞] = ￿υ1 (30e)
where ￿ω[t]≡ (￿K[t], ￿V [t], ￿C[t], ￿υ [t]) is a vector of four unknown scale-adjusted quantities. Some other vari-
ables that depend on ￿ω[t] are scale-adjusted final output ￿Y [t], scale-adjusted bounty flow ￿b[t], capital invest-
ment rate sK [t], R&D investment rate sV [t], interest rate r[t] and bountiable fraction ζ [t]. Their relationships
are given by the following static equilibrium conditions:
￿Y [t] = ￿A[t]1−α ￿K[t]α , with ￿A[t] = ￿V 1/(εσ(1−α)) (31a)
￿b[t] = βα￿Y [t]/￿V [t] (31b)
sK [t] = (1− sV [t])−
￿C[t]￿Y [t] (31c)
sV [t] = (￿υ [t] ·µ￿V [t]φ )1/(1−λ )/￿Y [t] (31d)
36From (29d), the instantaneous growth rate of bounty flow b is bˆ[t] = Yˆ [t]− Vˆ [t] and bˆ[∞] = (θK −θV )n≡ θυn in steady state.
Therefore, Lθυ serves as a normalization factor for b, as in the case of υ .
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r[t] =
α￿Y [t]￿K[t] −δ (31e)
ζ [t] = 1− (1−ζ0)e−
´ t
0 (￿ˆV [τ]+θV n)dτ , ζ [0] = ζ0, ζ [∞] = 1 (31f)
Equation (31f) results from (29e) by replacing the innovation rate Vˆ with ￿ˆV +θVn due to V = ￿VLθV , where￿ˆV = 0 in the long run. The normalized system features two state variables (￿K, ￿V ) and two jump variables
(￿C, ￿υ). These two state variables – capital and knowledge stocks – are predetermined at any point in time
and must evolve smoothly over time, whereas the two jump variables – aggregate consumption and price of
bounty claim – are free to make a discrete change in response to shocks. The normalized system is subject to
two initial-value boundary conditions represented by ￿K[0] = ￿K0 and ￿V [0] = ￿V0 at t = 0 as well as four other
boundary conditions represented by ￿K[∞] = ￿K1, ￿V [∞] = ￿V1, ￿C[∞] = ￿C1, and ￿υ [∞] = ￿υ1 at t→ ∞.37 This is a
nonlinear two-point boundary value problem and can only be solved numerically. However, these boundary
conditions are subject to the government-determined bounty rate β . So, before we can proceed to solve the
boundary value problem in Section 5, we need to work out formulas for the government to calculate the
bounty rate.
4.3.2 Optimal bounty rate and the new balanced-growth path
At the outset, setting ￿˙K = ￿˙V = ￿˙C = ￿˙υ = 0 in (30a) - (30d) allows us to solve for the steady-state boundary
conditions at t→ ∞ (see Appendix B for derivations):
￿K1 = ￿ sK1δ +θKn
￿1/(1−α) ￿A1 (32a)
￿V1 = ￿sV1￿ sK1δ +θKn
￿α/(1−α)￿ µ
θVn
￿1/λ￿θV
(32b)
￿C1 = (1− s1)￿Y1 (32c)
￿υ1 = βα￿￿Y1￿V1
￿￿
1
r1+Vˆ1− Yˆ1
￿
(32d)
where
sK1 = s∗K , ζBountied1 = 1 (32e)
37Recall that we label a variable with subscript 0 (1) to indicate that variable associated with a balanced-growth patent (bounty)
regime.
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sV1 = βαVˆ1
￿
1
r1+Vˆ1− Yˆ1
￿
(32f)
Note that ￿A1 = ￿V 1/(εσ(1−α))1 and ￿Y1 = ￿A1−α1 ￿Kα1 due to z = 1, while ζBountied1 = ζ [∞] = 1 in terms of (31f).
On this bounty-regime balanced-growth path, we have Kˆ1 = Cˆ1 = Yˆ1 = θKn, Vˆ1 = θVn, Aˆ1 = θAn, and
υˆ1 = bˆ1 = (θK − θV )n. As such, these long-run growth rates are regime-independent, so is the long-run
interest rate (r1 = r0 = r∗). As (32e) indicates, on a balanced-growth path, the decentralized bounty regime
always has the same physical capital investment rate as the social planner optimum (i.e., sK1 = s∗K ; see (26e)),
irrespective of the magnitude of the bounty rate β . However, in general, a bounty regime does not have the
same R&D investment rate as the Pareto optimal level (i.e., sV1 ￿= s∗V ).38 Unless the bounty rate, β , is set
rightly to internalize the externalities of knowledge spillovers and research congestion, the bounty regime
will not see a R&D investment rate as socially optimal. This problem can be fixed, however. By equalizing
sV1 = s∗V based on (26f) and (32f), we can derive a unique long-run Pareto optimal bounty rate, denoted by
β ∗. The formula for β ∗ is given by:
β ∗ = λ
ε−1 ·
￿
r+Vˆ − Yˆ
r+(1−φ)Vˆ − Yˆ
￿
(33)
where the innovation rate can relate to TFP growth rate in terms of Vˆ =
￿ ε−1
α
￿ ˆTFP.39 Hence, if β is replaced
with β ∗ in (32e), in the long-run, the allocation of the bounty-regime economy’s foregone consumption as a
fraction of final output to R&D will be identical to what would otherwise obtain under social optimum. That
is, sK1 = s∗K and sV1 = s∗V must hold together along a balanced-growth path if β = β ∗. Given these Pareto
optimal allocation of foregone consumption, a decentralized bounty-regime economy can completely mimic
the social planner’s Pareto optimum in the long run. For instance, if we compare (32a) - (32d) to (26a) -
(26d), it is easy to verify that ￿K1 = ￿K∗, ￿V1 = ￿V ∗, ￿A1 = ￿A∗, ￿Y1 = ￿Y ∗, ￿C1 = ￿C∗, ￿υ1 = ￿υ∗ and ￿υ1￿V1 = ￿υ∗￿V ∗along
a balanced growth path. Under this long-run Pareto optimal IB regime, the private value ￿υ1 of a potential
innovation is navigated to its social value ￿υ∗, so is the private value ￿υ1￿V1 of aggregate innovations to its
social value ￿υ∗￿V ∗. Such a bounty regime can remove monopoly distortions to build a distortion-free capital
stock, while also permitting to fully internalize the externalities of knowledge spillovers (φ ) and research
congestion (λ ) to develop a long-run Pareto optimal knowledge stock.
38There is a short cut to deriving either sK1 or sV1: setting m0 = 0 in (24e) yields sK1, while replacing αm0Vˆ0 with βαVˆ1 and
letting T → ∞ in (24f) yields sV1. In Appendix B, sK1 and sV1 are derived from steady-state equilibrium conditions.
39Note that without monopoly distortion TFP = V 1/(εσ) based on (18). This implies Vˆ = εσ · ˆTFP = ￿ αε−1￿ ˆTFP due to
ε = 11−σα .
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The formula for β ∗ requires information on an economy’s steady-state aggregate variables (innovation
rate Vˆ , final output growth rate Yˆ , and real interest rate r), parametrized externalities (knowledge spillovers
φ and research congestion λ ), and price elasticity of bountiable goods (ε). Data of this sort is empirically
available. Long-run innovation rate Vˆ may be not readily available, but this problem can be overcome by
relating innovation rate to TFP growth based on Vˆ =
￿ ε−1
α
￿ ˆTFP, where α is the capital share.
If the regime switch is only to remove monopoly distortions while maintaining the same R&D intensity
at the patent-regime steady state level, we can obtain a long-run suboptimal bounty rate, denoted by β ∗∗,
by equalizing sV0 and sV1 based on (24f) and (32f). The formula for this suboptimal bounty rate is given by
β ∗∗ = m
ζ
￿
1− e−(r−Yˆ−Vˆ )T
￿
(34)
In addition to the same steady-state aggregate variables as for the calculation of β ∗, the calculation of
β ∗∗requires the patent length (T ), the relative size of the patent-protected noncompetitive sector (ζ ), and the
monopoly-profit share (m) in aggregate capital income. Both β ∗and β ∗∗will be computed in the next section
for the model calibrated to an innovating economy like the United States.
5 Numerical Analysis: Transition Paths & Welfare
This section presents numerical analysis based on the normalized bounty-regime dynamic system of (30a) -
(30d) along with its associated two-point boundary conditions given in (30e).
5.1 Calibration of the model and steady-state simulations
At the outset we use a set of benchmark parameters to calibrate the patent-regime model to the United States.
These parameters, given in Table 1, are identical to or close to those used in previous calibration exercises.40
Table 1: Benchmark parameters for model calibration
Production: α = 0.36, σ = 1.80, µ = 0.21 φ = 0.50, λ = 0.65,
Preference: ρ = 0.04, γ = 1.0,
Depre. & Pop.: δ = 0.05, n= 0.015,
Patent Length: T = 20.
40See, for instance, Jones and Williams (2000) and Eicher and Turnovsky (2001).
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Production and preference parameters In calibration of the final goods production function, the param-
eter of α is set equal to 0.36, meaning that the gross capital income share in GDP is 36% and the labor
share is 64%. The parameter of σ is set equal to 1.80, which reflects the substitutability of capital goods
and must be less than 1/α , as noted earlier. The two parameters lead to a price elasticity of demand for
a typical capital good equal to 2.84 (= ε = 1/(1−σα)) and the markup rate of about 1.54 (= η = 1σα )
for patented capital goods.41 For the production function of durable-good designs, the knowledge-spillover
parameter, φ , is set equal to 0.50, which is less than the upper bound of φ¯ = 1− λ/(εσ(1−α)) ≈ 0.80
(see Footnote 16); the research-congestion parameter, λ , is set equal to 0.65; but the research productivity
parameter, µ , requires more elaboration and is to be calibrated later. For the preference parameters, the rate
of time preference, ρ , is constant at 0.04 per year and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is assumed
to be 1/γ = 1 (that is, γ = 1).
Depreciation, population, and patent length Another three parameters are the rate of physical capital
depreciation set at δ = 0.05 per year, the growth rate of labor supply (population) at n= 0.015 per year and
the patent length at T = 20. The parameter of T = 20 means that any newly granted patent expires in a finite
period of twenty years, which is consistent with US and WTO (World Trade Organization) patent policy.
Note that the time unit in the numerical analysis represents one year, since the chosen parameters such as ρ
and n are in annual rates.
Calibration of research productivity parameter µ Now let us return to calibration of the research pro-
ductivity parameter, µ . First, the above-calibrated production parameters (α , σ , φ , λ ) are sufficient to
compute the three growth kernels in terms of (23), which are θV = 2.1567 , θA = 0.6590, and θK = 1.6590.
The labor supply growth rate of n = 0.015 multiplied by these computed growth kernels then deliver the
following long-run growth rates of important macroeconomic variables for the benchmark patent regime:
Vˆ0 = 0.0324, Aˆ0 = 0.0099, ˆTFP0 = (1−α)Aˆ0 = 0.0063, and Kˆ = Yˆ = Cˆ = 0.0249. Second, since labor
supply L is exogenous, we chose L[0] = L0 = 1. Also, since there is only one remaining parameter, µ , to
be calibrated, we have a degree of freedom to choose either K0 or V0 at t = 0, and we chose V0 = 1, which
implies ￿V0 = V0/LθV0 = 1. Third, with ￿V0 = 1 and all the already-calibrated parameters, we can solve the
41In contrast, the markup rate for unpatented durables equals one. Given the share of patented durables less than 50% (as will
be shown in the benchmark case, the share is 47.6%), the industry-wide average markup rate is about 1.26, which falls onto the
empirical evidence range (see Norrbin 1993 and Basu 1996).
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eight equations of (24a) - (24h) for parameter µ and the other seven variables (￿K0, ￿C0, ￿υ0 sK0, sV0, r0, ζ0).
Using this procedure, parameter µ is calibrated at 0.21, as indicated in Table 1.
In calibration of the µ parameter, we have generated the initial patent-regime steady state at the same
time. Now with a complete set of benchmark parameters in Table 1, we can solve (32a) - (32f) and (33)
for the bounty-regime steady state, respectively, based on the long-run Pareto-optimal bounty rate (β ∗) and
suboptimal bounty rate (β ∗∗). Hence, listed in Table 2 are three sets of steady-state results including (i)
patent-regime steady state, (ii) bounty-regime steady state with long-run Pareto optimal bounty rate β ∗, and
(iii) bounty-regime steady state with long-run suboptimal bounty rate β ∗∗. The following analysis are in
order:
Table 2: Steady states of patent and intertemporal-bounty regimes
Patent Regime (Benchmark) Intertemporal-Bounty Regime
patent length T = 20 bounty rate β ∗ = 0.49 β ∗∗ = 0.15￿K0 6.07 ￿K1 17.51 7.88￿V0 1.00 ￿V1 16.66 1.22￿Y0 1.87 ￿Y1 4.86 2.19￿C0 1.36 ￿C1 3.06 1.53￿υ0 1.72 ￿υ1 0.90 1.65￿υ0￿V0 1.72 ￿υ1￿V1 14.99 2.01
sK0 0.24 sK1 0.27 0.27
sV0 0.0297 sV1 0.0999 0.0297￿C0/￿Y0 0.73 ￿C1/￿Y1 0.63 0.70￿K0/￿Y0 3.24 ￿K1/￿Y1 3.60 3.60￿V0/￿Y0 0.53 ￿V1/￿Y1 3.43 0.56
z0 0.98 z1 1.00 1.00
ζPatented0 0.48 ζBountied1 1.00 1.00
Π/Y 0.04 B/Y (= αβ ) 0.18 0.05
Remarks: β ∗ (β ∗∗) is long-run Pareto-optimal (sub-optimal) bounty rate. Regime-independent are long-run
real interest rate r0 = r1 ≈ 0.0499 and long-run growth rates: Vˆ0 = Vˆ1 ≈ 0.0324; Kˆ0 = Yˆ0 = Cˆ0 = Kˆ1 = Yˆ1 =
Cˆ1 ≈ 0.025, ˆTFP0 = ˆTFP1 ≈ 0.063. Figures are computed using benchmark parameters from Table 1.
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Patent-regime steady state (patent length T = 20) First, from Table 2, the steady state of the benchmark
patent regime pretty much matches the United States macroeconomic features including the R&D intensity
(sV0 = 0.0297), the physical capital investment rate (sK0 = 0.24), the consumption/GDP ratio (￿C0/￿Y0 =
1− sK0− sV0 = 0.73), the capital/output ratio (￿K0/￿Y0 = 3.24), in addition to the long-run real interest rate r
and long-run growth rates of GDP and TFP (see Remarks of Table 2). The knowledge/output ratio (￿V0/￿Y0)
is 0.53. Empirically, this ratio is not precisely available. Under the patent regime, 48% of durable goods
firms are patented (ζ0 ≈ 0.48) and the resulting monopoly-induced technical distortion makes TFP about
2% below its potential level, as implied by z0 ≈ 0.98.
Bounty-regime steady state (bounty rate β ∗ = 0.49) We assume the calibrated US economy is initially
in the patent-regime steady state. If we let this decentralized economy switches to an intertemporal-bounty
regime that can fully mimic the social planner’s long-run Pareto optimum characterized by (26a) - (26g), the
required bounty rate needs to be set at β ∗ = 0.49 according to (33). This long-run Pareto optimal bounty
rate dictates that for each dollar sales of a bountied durable under marginal cost pricing, the government
pays a bounty flow of about 49 cents annually to the bounty-claim holder. The resulting annual aggregate
bounty flows (B) account for 18% of GDP (= Y ), which is funded by a lump-sum tax. In contrast, under
the patent regime with a markup rate (η) of 1.54, the patent holder receives a profit margin of 54 cents from
each $1.54 sales of a patented durable. Such patent-created monopoly profits (Π) account for about 4% of
GDP. Economists call these profits “economic profits,” which are profits beyond the usual or standard rate
of business profit.
By implementing the long-run Pareto optimal bounty rate of β ∗ = 0.49, the regime switch removes
monopoly distortions and optimizes the allocation of foregone consumption to fully internalize the knowledge-
spillover and research-congestion externalities. This allows the economy to attain the Pareto optimum in the
long-run. As the figures indicate, in the long run, the economy becomes much more intensive in capital and
knowledge under this bounty regime. The capital investment rate increases from sK0 = 0.24 to sK1 = 0.27,
while the R&D intensity increases significantly from sV0 = 0.0297 to sV1 = 0.0999. The stock of scale-
adjusted capital rises from ￿K0 = 6.07 to ￿K1 = 17.05, while even more significant is a remarkable increase
in the stock of scale-adjusted knowledge from ￿V0 = 1.00 to ￿V1 = 16.66. As a result, under the regime
switch, the capital/output ratio (￿K/￿Y ) rises from 3.24 to 3.60, the knowledge/output ratio (￿V/￿Y ) rises sig-
nificantly from 0.53 to 3.43, and the shadow price of aggregate innovations is navigated upwards to the
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social value of ￿υ1￿V1 = ￿υ∗￿V ∗ = 14.99, way above the private value of aggregate innovations under the patent
regime. This explains why the regime switch can generate a long-run consumption gain of about 124%
(comparing ￿C1 = 3.06 to ￿C0 = 1.36). A drop of the consumption/GDP ratio from 0.73 to 0.63 is, in fact,
indispensable. Compared to the patent regime, the long-run Pareto-optimal bounty regime requires much
more foregone consumption to establish an economy that is much more knowledge-intensive and much more
capital-intensive.
Bounty-regime steady state (bounty rate β ∗∗ = 0.15) What if the government sets the bounty rate at the
long-run suboptimal level β ∗∗ according to (34)? First, this suboptimal bounty rate β ∗∗ is equal to 0.15,
much smaller than the long-run Pareto optimal bounty rate of β ∗ = 0.49. Thus, the steady-state ratio of
aggregate bounties to GDP (B/Y ) can decrease to 0.05 in a significant way (long-run Pareto optimal B/Y =
0.18) and can greatly reduce the required lump-sum tax. Under this suboptimal bounty regime, although
the capital investment rate can reach the Pareto optimal level (sK1 = s∗K = 0.27), the R&D intensity is
maintained at the suboptimal patent-regime level (sV1 = sV0 = 0.0297). As a consequence, the private value
(￿υ1￿V1 = 2.01) of aggregate innovations under the suboptimal bounty regime is way below the Pareto-optimal
social value (￿υ1￿V1 = ￿υ∗￿V ∗ = 14.99), thereby resulting in a knowledge stock (￿V1 = 1.22) only slightly above
the patent-regime level (￿V0 = 1) but way below the socially optimal level (￿V1 = ￿V ∗ = 16.66). Switching
form patents to this suboptimal bounty regime still allows the economy to secure a long-run consumption
gain equal to 12% (￿C1 = 1.53 > ￿C0 = 1.36). But this gain is quite mild, compared to the long-run optimal
consumption gain of 124% mentioned above. This is not a surprise at all, since β ∗∗ only resolves monopoly
distortions, whereas β ∗addresses both monopoly distortions and externalities.
The above analysis focuses on the regime switch’s steady state effects only. However, a complete welfare
analysis must take transitional dynamics into account. To this end, we trap how the bounty-regime dynamic
system evolves over time in transtion in the next subsection.
5.2 Dynamics in transition
Numerical solution To compute transitional dynamics, we focus on the regime switch by implementing
the long-run Pareto optimal bounty rate β ∗ = 0.49. The dynamic system of (30a) - (30d) calibrated by the
benchmark parameter set (Table 1) is found to display saddle path stability around its long-run stationary
equilibrium, which refers to the bounty-regime steady state, [￿K1, ￿V1, ￿C1, ￿υ1], shown in Table 2. The regime
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Figure 2: Absolute errors of solving (30a) -(30d) with Python’s scikits.bvp_solver
Remarks: ￿ω ≡ [￿K, ￿V , ￿C, ￿υ ] for t ∈ [0,1000] and −1×10−10 < error < 1×10−10.
switch from patents to the intertemporal bounty means a structural change taking place at t = 0. Comput-
ing the transitional dynamics should proceed by trapping the calibrated model’s nonlinear stable manifold
rather than its linearized model’s local saddle path around the bounty-regime steady state. I used a Python
boundary value problem solver (scikits.bvp_solver 1.1) to solve the calibrated system of (30a) - (30d) for
the approximate solution ￿ω = [￿K, ￿V , ￿C, ￿υ ].42 The calibrated system is defined on [0, ∞), a semi-infinite time
interval. To apply the Python bvp solver, I truncated it into a finite time interval, [0, tmax], where tmax = 1000,
and it turns out that one thousand years is long enough for economy to work out all transitional effects.43
Indeed, the Python bvp solver proved fast in just a few seconds and generated precise enough results. As
42scikits.bvp_solver (http://pypi.python.org/pypi/scikits.bvp_solver) is a Python package that wraps a Fortran BVP_SOLVER
based on Mono Implicit Runge Kutta methods; see Shampine et al. (2006). All computations for the present paper are implemented
using Python 2.7.3 on Mac OS 10.6.8. The Python code is available from the author upon request. A Matlab code using bvp4c is
also available.
43The boundary conditions at t → ∞ need to be approximately satisfied at tmax. If not, we must increase the value of tmax until
the errors are negligible.
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Figure 2 indicates, the approximate solution is precise to the extent that its absolute errors (or residuals) are
all less than 10−10 in absolute value.
Figure 3: Numerical solution of dynamic system (30a) - (30d)
The approximate solution is shown in Figure 3 including the transition paths of the dynamic system’s
two state variables (￿K, ￿V ) and two jump variables (￿C, ￿υ). The stocks of capital ￿K[t] and knowledge ￿V [t] have
continued to rise in transition until they both reached their long-run steady state equilibrium, respectively.
At the moment of the regime switch, the consumption flow ￿C jumps down from ￿C0 to ￿C[0] and then starts to
grow over time toward a higher steady-state level. To the contrary, the price of the bounty claim ￿υ jumps up
from ￿υ0 to ￿υ [0] and then starts to fall over time toward a lower steady-state level.
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Figure 4: Transition paths: Vˆ , ￿TFP, ￿Y , ζ , and B/Y
The above-described solution allows to compute other variables’ trajectories. Figure 4 indicates that: (i)
at the moment of the regime switch, the innovation rate Vˆ ≡ V˙/V jumps up remarkably from Vˆ0 to Vˆ [0] and
then drifts down smoothly in transition to the same steady state level (Vˆ0 = Vˆ1 = θVn) (panel (a)); (ii) to a
lesser degree, both total factor productivity ￿TFP (= ￿A1−α = ￿V 1/(εσ)) and final output ￿Y jump up at t = 0,
but unlike the innovation rate, they both continue to rise in transition to their long-run steady state levels
(panels (b) & (c)); and (iii) driven by persistent innovation (Vˆ [t] > 0), the bountied fraction ζ of capital
goods keeps rising all the way toward one (its long-run steady state level), while the bounty/output ratio
B/Y also keeps increasing in transition to a higher steady state ratio equal to 0.18 – this ratio is greater than
the patent-regime steady state profit/output ratio Π0/Y0 = 0.04 (Table 2 or pane d)
Notably, the regime switch makes the economy transition to one much more intensive in both capital
and knowledge. Figure 5 indicates this feature: the capital/output and knowledge/output ratios ( ￿K￿Y , ￿V￿Y ) have
trended upward over time remarkably to their new steady state equilibrium, although these ratios experience
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Figure 5: Transition paths: ￿K￿Y , ￿V￿Y
a small drop at the moment of the regime switch when final output Y jumps up slightly. All these transi-
tion paths described above make intuitive sense: a more capital-intensive, more knowledge-intensive econ-
omy must require the dual occurrences of short-run consumption sacrifices and bounty-claim appreciation
(compared to the initial patent value ￿υ0) so as to draw more resources into capital accumulation and R&D
investment. By implementing the long-run Pareto optimal bounty rate of β ∗ = 0.49, this bounty regime can
therefore raise the long-run productive capacity to sustain an eventually higher level of consumption than
does the initial patent regime.
Market mechanism How does the decentralized IBmechanism work to drive the calibrated U.S. economy
to transition to a long-run Pareto optimal balanced growth path, as characterized above by Figures 3 - 5?
First of all, this involves a removal of all patent-created distortions. Thus, at the moment of the regime
switch, the market for capital goods becomes perfectly competitive, selling all durables at marginal cost.
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Figure 6: Transition paths: sK , sV , s, r, b˜υ˜
This boosts market demand especially for those durables whose patents have not yet expired, while also
removing the patent-induced technical distortion on total factor productivity (i.e., z0 jumps to z[0] = 1). This
market mechanism explains why total factor productivity and GDP ( ￿TFP, ￿Y ) jump up together at t = 0
(Figure 4 (b) & (c)), and why the capital /output ratio ( ￿K￿Y ) and knowledge/output ratio ( ￿V￿Y ) jump down at the
same time (Figure 5), given that ￿K and ￿V are predetermined at any point in time.
Further, at the moment of the regime switch, the long-run Pareto-optimal bounty rate β ∗ is strong enough
to reward technological innovation. It creates bounty claims that are more valuable than patents (￿υ jumps
up at t = 0; Figure 3 (d)) in the asset market. It also generates a strong bounty flow relative to bounty-claim
price, ￿b￿υ , that outweighs the initial monopoly profit flow relative to patent price, ￿π0￿υ0 (Figure 6 (d)). Thus,
switching to the bounty regime presents a strong incentive to boost investment in both physical capital and
R&D, causing both sK and sV to jump up at t = 0 (Figure 6 (a)). The resulting strong demands for foregone
consumption therefore make the real interest rate r (Figure 6 (c)) and saving rate s (Figure 6 (b)) jump
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up, respectively, at the moment of the regime switch. All these market forces prompt the calibrated U.S.
economy to evolve in transition toward a more capital-intensive and more knowledge-intensive economy.
5.3 Welfare change in transition to the bounty-regime steady state
Using the numerical trajectory of consumption shown earlier in Figure 3 (c), we can compute the welfare
change for the regime switch from patents to an intertemporal bounty that allows the calibrated U.S. econ-
omy to attain Pareto optimality in the long run. Following Lucas (1987), the welfare change is the measure
of Ω[t] that obeys
U [{(1+Ω[t])c[τ]Patent}tτ=0] =U [{c[τ]Bounty}tτ=0], 0≤ τ ≤ t < ∞ (35)
where {c[τ]Patent}tτ=0 is a stream of per capita consumption for the time interval of [0, t] under the steady-
state patent regime and {c[τ]Bounty}tτ=0 is the stream of per capita consumption for the same time interval
under a bounty regime in transition. As such, starting from the moment of the regime switch,Ω[t]measures a
consumption gain for a time interval with the length of duration equal to t, whereasΩ[∞] is the consumption
gain for the entire semi-infinite time interval, [0, ∞). For instance, if Ω[t] turns out to be positive, it means
that in time interval [0, t], the regime switch generates a welfare gain equivalent to a percent (=Ω[t]×100%)
increase from the patent-regime steady state.
Formulae for Ω Note that per capita consumption c[t]≡C[t]/L[t] can be written as c[t] = ￿C[t]L[t]θK−1 =￿C[t]L[t]θA = ￿C[t]eθAnt in terms of (23) and L[t] = ent . Now, given the initial steady state consumption of ￿C0
and the bounty-regime transition path of ￿C[t], we can compute the welfare measure ofΩ[t], t ∈ [0, ∞), based
on the following formulae:
Ω[t] =

ψa[t]1/(1−γ)−1, with ψa[t] =
´ t
0
￿C[τ]1−γe−(ρ−n−(1−γ)θAn)τdτ´ t
0
￿C1−γ0 e−(ρ−n−(1−γ)θAn)τdτ , γ ￿= 1
eψb[t]−1, with ψb[t] =
´ t
0 log[￿C[τ]/￿C0]e−(ρ−n)τdτ´ t
0 e
−(ρ−n)τdτ , γ = 1
(36)
If one overlooked the transitional impacts by presuming that the economy jumps from the initial patent-
regime balanced-growth path directly to the new bounty-regime balanced-growth path, then the bounty-
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Figure 7: Changing welfare in transition based on β ∗ and benchmark parameters including γ = 1
regime scale-adjusted consumption ￿C would jump to ￿C1 from ￿C0 at t = 0 and formulae (36) would reduce
to
Ω[t] =
￿C1￿C0 −1≡Ω, t ∈ [0, ∞), (37)
irrespective of whether γ ￿= 1 or γ = 1.
Magnitudes ofΩ[t],Ω[∞] andΩ From the forgoing transitional analysis, the time profile of the consump-
tion flow (Figure 3 (c)) must imply that that Ω[t]≤Ω[∞]<Ω for t ∈ [0, ∞). As reported earlier using Table
2, The regime switch can result in a remarkable increase of 124% in steady-state consumption if the bounty
rate is set at the long-run Pareto optimal level of β ∗ = 0.49. This implies Ω = 1.24. The transition path of
Ω[t] is displayed in Figure 7. As indicated, for the first year (t = 1), there is a consumption loss of 19.5%
(due toΩ[1]≈−0.195), but such short-run losses keep diminishing over time. By the time of t = 35 (years),
households have fully recouped short-run consumption sacrifices (due to Ω[35] ≈ 0, and would eventually
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secure a net consumption gain of 21.8% (due to Ω[∞] ≈ 0.218) in the long run. This net gain remains
impressive enough, although it is much smaller than the 124% steady-state consumption gain.
Regardless, the short-run cost of switching patents to a long-run Pareto optimal regime appears quite
high (for instance, Ω[1] = −0.195,), although the net gain is impressive in the long run. Certainly, society
can instead take a conservative route to a long-run suboptimal bounty regime without correcting underin-
vestment in R&D. Then from the regime switch associated with a long-run suboptimal bounty rate equal to
β ∗∗ = 0.15, the short-run consumption loss for the first year can be reduced from 19.5% to 6.2%. Yet, this
short-run cost-saving route is accompanied by a significant drop (from 21.8% to 4.5%) in net consumption
gains and by an even more significant drop (from124% to 12%) in steady-state consumption gains. For this
suboptimal regime switch, the transition paths are not presented here.
Robustness checks We close the welfare analysis by conducting robustness checks on the switch to the
long-run Pareto optimal bounty regime. The dynamic system of (30a) - (30d) exhibits saddle-path stability.
This feature appears robust to parameter changes according to numerous experiments. The welfare measure
of Ω[∞], however, is sort of sensitive to parameter γ (intertemporal substitution) and rather sensitive to
parameter λ (research congestion). As shown in Table 3, for instance, an increase in the value of γ from
1.00 (benchmark) to 2.00 causes Ω[∞] to drop from 0.2180 to 0.1273 under the benchmark parameter of
λ = 0.65. That is, if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption (1/γ) is decreased from
1.00 to 0.5, the percent gain in consumption drops significantly from 21.80% to 12.73% for the entire
time horizon, although the steady-state consumption gain, measured by Ω, appears quite insensitive to this
parameter change. This is consistent with our economic intuition: if future consumption is less substitutable
for present consumption, the measure of Ω[∞] must get smaller.
Even more sensitive is the measure of Ω[∞] with respect to parameter λ , which inversely reflects the
extent of research congestion. For instance, given the benchmark parameter of γ = 1.00, a decrease in λ
from 0.65 to 0.50 causes the measure of Ω[∞] to drop sharply from 0.2180 to 0.0966 and also makes the
measure of Ω fall from 1.24 to 0.64. Namely, if the extent of research congestion is so significant that
λ decreases to 0.50, the welfare improvement resulting from the regime switch is reduced to a gain of
9.66% in consumption, compared to the benchmark 21.80% gain. Regardless, the central message of these
numerical experiments maintains that an intertemporal bounty regime can be a welfare-improving Pareto
optimal alternative to the world’s patent system.
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Table 3: Sensitivity analysis of parameters γ and λ on welfare change
γ
λ = 0.65∗ λ = 0.50
Ω Ω[∞] Ω Ω[∞]
2.00 1.12 0.1273 0.58 0.0668
1.50 1.18 0.1624 0.61 0.0792
1.00∗ 1.24 0.2180 0.64 0.0966
0.75 1.28 0.2582 0.65 0.1082
0.50 1.32 0.3109 0.67 0.1233
Remark: ∗ indicates a benchmark parameter.
6 Concluding Remarks
First-generation endogenous growth models feature the empirically implausible scale effects, implying a
faster steady-state growth rate for a larger economy. The progression to non-scale growth models removes
the unwanted scale effects, but at the expense of raising the dimensionality. The present paper is no excep-
tion. It has to deal with a four-dimensional dynamic system that governs the transitional dynamics when
the initial patent regime is switched to an intertemporal bounty regime. This system consists of two state
variables – capital & knowledge stocks – evolving at different paces and must be normalized into a station-
ary one using multiple normalization factors. Python’s boundary value problem solver (scikits.bvp_solver)
proved fast and precise in solving such a normalized dynamic system.
The paper has demonstrated that a decentralized market mechanism via the proposed intertemporal
bounty system can duplicate Pareto optimality, provided that the rate of bounty is set rightly to internalize
externalities. Under this system, the prize for innovation is not paid once and for all. Instead, the prize is
dynamically amortized in an infinitely time domain as periodic bounties paid to the holder of bounty claims.
These periodic bounties are calculated using a government-determined bounty rate times observed market
sales. In this paper an important formula is derived to calculate a long-run Pareto optimal bounty rate
that allows the economy to attain Pareto optimum in the long run by correcting both monopoly distortions
and externalities such as knowledge spillovers and research congestion. Another important formula is also
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derived to calculate a long-run suboptimal bounty rate that can only serve to correct monopoly distortions.
Empirically, the social value of innovation is usually much above the private value of innovation. The
government can take the long-run Pareto optimal bounty rate as an upper bound and the long-run subopti-
mal bounty rate as the lower bound when a bounty rate is to be determined to implement the intertemporal
bounty system. Empirical data for the two bounty rates are available in the real world. Moreover, the bounty
rate can be adjusted as desired to changing economic conditions. This makes the intertemporal bounty sys-
tem practical either as a Pareto optimal alternative or as a suboptimal yet welfare-improving alternative, to
the world’s patent system.
Appendix
A Patent regime’s balanced growth paths
Along a balanced-growth path, every variable grows at a constant rate, including zero growth. Such steady-
state growth rates (Vˆ0 ≡ V˙0V0 , Aˆ0 ≡ A˙0A0 , Kˆ0 ≡ K˙0K0 and Yˆ0 ≡ Y˙0Y0 ) can be obtained by solving the four equations
system:
Yˆ0− Kˆ0 = 0 (A.1a)
(φ −1)Vˆ0+λYˆ0 = 0 (A.1b)
Yˆ0− (1−α)Aˆ0−αKˆ0 = (1−α)n (A.1c)
Aˆ0− 1εσ(1−α)Vˆ0 = 0 (A.1d)
These equations result from (21a), (21b), (18), and the definition of A. For instance, (21a) implies Yˆ0 = Kˆ0 =
Cˆ0. Solving (A.1a) - (A.1d) yields (22a) - (22c). From (14) and (8b), the patent price equation is given by
υ = sVY/V˙ = sVY/(VˆV ). Along a balanced-growth path, both sV and Vˆ are stationary. Thus, differentiating
the patent price equation yields
υˆ0 ≡ υ˙0υ0 = Yˆ0−Vˆ0 = (θK−θV )n (A.2)
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Derivations of the remaining stationary variables are in order. First, from the Euler condition (3) and using
the growth kernel θA, the steady-state interest rate is given by
r0 = ρ+ γθAn (A.3)
Next, from (20b), the steady-state capital/output ratio is given below
K0
Y0
=
α(1−m0)
r0+δ
(A.4)
This result and (8a) combine to imply the steady-state capital investment rate,
sK0 =
α(1−m0)
r0+δ
(δ +θKn) (A.5)
Recall that Π denotes aggregate profit flows and π =Π/(ζV ) measures a patented firm’s profit flow. Using
(20a) and (13) yields the steady-state price of a newly issued patent,
υ0[t] =
αm0Y0[t]
ζ0V0[t]
￿
1− e−(r0−Yˆ0+Vˆ0)T
r0− Yˆ0+Vˆ0)
￿
, or ￿υ0 = αm0￿Y0ζ0￿V0
￿
1− e−(r0−Yˆ0+Vˆ0)T
r0− Yˆ0+Vˆ0)
￿
(A.6)
where ￿υ0 = υ0[t]/L[t]θK−θV , ￿Y0 =Y0[t]/L[t]θK , and ￿V0 =V0[t]/L[t]θV are constant on a balanced-growth path.
Also, with ζ˙0 = 0 and Vˆ = Vˆp = Vˆnp = θVn in the steady state, either (16a) or (16b) implies the equilibrium
patented goods fraction,
ζ0 = 1− e−Vˆ0T (A.7)
The R&D equilibrium condition (14) requires ξ [t]υ [t] = 1 at any instant, which implies υ [t]V˙ [t] = sV [t]Y [t]
in terms of (8b). Along a balanced growth, we therefore have sV0 = υ0Vˆ0V0/Y0, which, together with (A.6),
implies
sV0 = Vˆ0
￿
αm0
ζ0
￿￿
1− e−(r0−Yˆ0+Vˆ0)T
r0− Yˆ0+Vˆ0
￿
(A.8)
Lastly, the two stock variables (K, V ) are non-stationary. Using these scale-adjusted quantities, ￿K ≡
K/LθK , ￿Y ≡ Y/LθK , and ￿A = A/LθA , we can transform the final goods production function (18) into its
intensive form, ￿Y = z￿A1−α ￿Kα , and the motion of capital accumulation (12) into ￿˙K≡ d ￿Kdt = sK￿Y−(δ+θKn)￿K.
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Setting ￿˙K = 0 then yields the steady state scale-adjusted stock of capital,
￿K0 = ￿A0￿ z0sK0δ +θKn
￿1/(1−α)
, (A.9)
On a balanced-growth path, the stock of knowledge capital V keeps growing at a rate equal to θVn. But
we can normalize V to ￿V ≡ V/LθV . Then dividing each side of the innovation equation (21b) by V0 while
replacing V0 and Y0 with ￿V0LθV and ￿Y0LθK in this equation, we obtain
V˙0
V0
= θVn= µ￿V φ−10 (sV0￿Y0)λL(φ−1)θV+λθK (A.10)
where term L(φ−1)θV+λθK can drop out due to (φ −1)θV +λθK = 0 (see (23)). Now using ￿Y0 = z0￿A1−α0 ￿Kα0 ,￿A0 = ￿V 1/(εσ(1−α))0 , and result (A.9), we can easily solve (A.10) for the steady state scale-adjusted stock of
knowledge, which is given in (24b).
B Steady state of the normalized dynamic system
First, setting ￿˙K = 0 in (28a) and using (31a) yield the stationary equilibrium of ￿K,
￿K1 = ￿ sKδ +θKn
￿1/(1−α) ￿A1 (B.1)
Second, setting ￿˙K = 0 in (28a) and using (31e) yield the equilibrium capital investment rate,
sK1 = (δ +θKn)
￿K1￿Y1 = (δ +θKn)
￿
α
r1+δ
￿
(B.2)
Third, setting ￿˙V = 0 in (30b) yields (sV1￿Y1)λ = θV nµ￿V φ−11 and (31d) implies (sV1￿Y1)1−λ = µ ￿υ1￿V φ1 . Combin-
ing these two equations yields the equilibrium level of R&D,
sV1￿Y1 = ￿υ1￿V1θVn (B.3)
Fourth, replacing ￿b with (31b) and setting ￿˙υ = 0 in (30d), we obtain
r1−βα
￿Y1￿υ1￿V1 = (θK−θV )n (B.4)
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Then replacing ￿υ1￿V1 in (B.4) with sV1￿Y1/θVn based on the result of (B.3), we obtain the equilibrium R&D
investment rate,
sV1 =
βα ·θVn
r1− (θK−θV )n (B.5)
where r1 = r0 = ρ+ γθAn. Substituting sV1into (B.3) yields (32d) in the text.
Fifth, using ￿Y = ￿A1−α ￿Kα and (B.1), we can rewrite (sV1￿Y1)λ = θV nµ￿V φ−11 (from step 3) as
sλV1
￿
sK1
δ +θKn
￿λα/(1−α) ￿Aλ1 = θVnµ￿V φ−11 (B.6)
Then replacing ￿A1 with ￿V 1/(εσ(1−α))1 and collect the ￿V1 terms in (B.6), we obtain (32b) in the text.
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